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22 DEC 1961

For

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Military Representative of the President

**SUBJECT: Distribution of the Report of the Foreign
Weapons Evaluation (Ethel) Panel
(Meeting held 16-17 November 1961)**

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED.
06/26/03.

1. In answer to your request, I give you below an evaluation of the suitability of the distribution of the subject report. The detailed dissemination is set forth in attachment A hereto. This report was prepared by a panel of scientific experts operating under the sponsorship of [redacted] and the Atomic Energy Commission to provide a preliminary evaluation of the Soviet weapons development as disclosed by analysis of their recent nuclear test series.

25X1

2. [redacted] prepared an original 50 copies of this report which was distributed to the panel members; to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; to the Director of Military Applications, AEC; to the CIA for additional distribution to the Intelligence Community, the White House, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Air Force Intelligence reproduced 20 additional copies of this report for temporary use of the Nuclear Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, and the AEC reproduced eleven additional copies for internal AEC distribution. In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) distributed 157 copies of excerpts from this report as a supplement to its Intelligence Summary of 25 November 1961. The main conclusions of the report were also included in SNIE 11-14-61, 102 copies of which were distributed to various Government agencies. Finally, the material from this report was included in a number of classified briefings of Government officials having a need for information on the Soviet nuclear threat.

[redacted]

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3. The material included in the subject report was the most authoritative evaluation of recent Soviet nuclear weapons development and, therefore, of great value to all persons requiring an understanding of the Soviet military threat. The intelligence sources involved in the preparation of the report were not particularly sensitive, since the Soviets are fully aware of the existence of a U. S. nuclear test detection system. However, they may not have realized the degree of sophistication of this system.

4. I believe the dissemination of intelligence material should be restricted so far as possible to avoid the risk of unauthorized disclosures. The distribution of this particular report appears on the surface to be very broad. However, after study, it seems to me that authoritative information on the Soviet atomic weapons program is of great importance to many in government, including men on the President's staff, the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, officials of the Defense Department, and the Defense intelligence agencies, the Atomic Energy Commission, its staff and the weapons laboratories, members of the JAEIC Committee and of USIB, as well as certain officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.

5. Therefore, I conclude that no very significant change in distribution would have been warranted, and to have curtailed distribution might have involved the risk of withholding important information from those who had a need-to-know.

SIGNED
John A. McCone
Director

O/DD/I
R. Amory, Jr. /NSS
13 Dec 61
Rewritten JAM:at 18Dec61

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - DCI
1 cc - DDCI
1 cc - DDI
1 cc - AD/SI 1 cc - ER

Distribution of Bethe Panel Report

I. Original Distribution

1.
2.
3.
4. Dr. Mark Bethe Panel
5. Dr. Cowan Bethe Panel
6. Dr. Spence Bethe Panel
7. Dr. Foster Bethe Panel
8. Dr. Goeckermann Bethe Panel
9. Dr. Bethe Bethe Panel
10. Dr. Street Bethe Panel
11. Dr. Martinelli Bethe Panel
12.
13. Dr. Bing, ARPA, DOD
14.
15.
16.
- 23 - 24 AFCIN Gen. Breitweiser
- 25 - 44 CIA, Dr. Scoville
- 45 - 49 OSD, Hon. Gerald W. Johnson
50. Gen. Betts, AEC

(Identical distribution was made of a second version of the report which contained a minor revision.)

II. AF Distribution

- A. AFCIN received copies 23, 24 of original report, which were distributed as follows.
 1. Frank Perez (file), approx. 12 people in his office had access
 2. Col. Stoll AFCIN 2B5
- B. Cable versions of this report went to all Directors of Intelligence of AF major commands in the form of a personal message from Gen. Breitweiser.

- C. 20 copies of the original report reproduced with originator's approval.
Lt. Col. Kent Howard, Sec of Nuclear Panel of Scientific Advisory Board of AF took the 20 copies to the Panel meeting headed by Gen. Twining. Copies returned to AFCIN after meeting.

Panel Members present at Meeting:

1. Gen. Twining
2. Gen. Doolittle
3. Dr. Wm. O. Baker
4. Dr. John S. Foster
5. Mr. Trevor Gardner
6. Prof. David T. Griggs
7. Dr. Simon Ramo
8. Dr. Ted Taylor
9. Dr. John Wheeler
10. Dr. L. S. Shinegold
11. Maj. Gen. H. T. Wheelless
12. Maj. Gen. D. A. Burchinal
13. Maj. Gen. D. A. Breitweiser
14. Maj. Gen. W. W. Moneyer
15. Maj. Gen. J. F. Wisenhand
16. Brig. Gen. R. W. Wassell
17. Gen. Curtis LeMay
18. Lt. Gen. Ferguson
19. Col. Thorne
20. Lt. Col. Loyd Jensen (Secretary)
21. Lt. Col. Kent Howard (Secretary)

III. CIA Distribution of the Bethe Panel Report:

CIA received copies 25-44 from which were distributed as follows:

25X1

- 1.- White House Naval Aide
- 1 - Military Representative of the President
- 1 - Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
- 1 - US Delegation to Conference on Nuclear Test
- 1 - JAEIC Secretariat

1 - C/WAT/ABCD	
1 - Army	JASIC Member
1 - State	" "
2 - Navy	" "
1 - AF	" "
1 - AEC	" "
2 - JCS	" "
1 - FBI	" "
1 - NSA	" "
1 - Held in Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA	

A summary of the conclusions of the Bethe report, without reference thereto, was incorporated in NIE 11-14-61.

IV. AEC Distribution

AEC received 2 copies of original report, 1 to Gen. Betts from [] the second through JASIC distribution. 11 additional copies of an almost verbatim summary were reproduced and distributed as follows:

Dr. Seaborg
Mr. Olson
Mr. Wilson
Dr. Haworth
Gen. Manager's Office
Director, Military Applications
Dr. Kavanaugh
Gen. Advisory Committee (all members briefed)
Dr. Foster
Dr. Bradbury
Mr. Stewart, Albuquerque Operation Office

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Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000800070002-7

V. DIA Distribution

DIA Distributed relatively complete summary as a Supplement to its Bulletin on November 24, 1961

<u>To</u>	<u>Copies</u>
JCS/SSO	1-25
AF/SSO for ACSI/AF	26-50
AFSSOP	51-52
FBI	53
Army/SSO for ACSI/Army	54-71
ASA	72-75
Navy/SSO for INI	76-87
NSG	88-89
CIA	90-141
NSA for DIRNSA Attn: C.3122	142-153
NIC	154-157



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Military Representative of the President

SUBJECT : Distribution of the Report of the Foreign
Weapons Evaluation (Bethe) Panel
(Meeting held 16-17 November 1961)

1. In answer to your request, I give you below an evaluation of the suitability of the distribution of the subject report. The detailed dissemination is set forth in attachment A hereto. This report was prepared by a panel of scientific experts operating under the sponsorship of [redacted] and the Atomic Energy Commission to provide a preliminary evaluation of the Soviet weapons development as disclosed by analysis of their recent nuclear test series.

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3. The material included in the subject report was the most authoritative evaluation of recent Soviet nuclear weapons development and, therefore, of great value to all persons requiring an understanding of the Soviet military threat. The intelligence sources involved in the preparation of the report were not particularly sensitive, since the Soviets are fully aware of the existence of a U. S. nuclear test detection system. However, they may not have realized the degree of sophistication of this system.

4. I have considered the distribution given this report, the use which has been made of the material therein in other intelligence documents, the sensitivity of the sources, and the great importance of the authoritative information on the Soviet atomic weapons program to all government officials charged with countering the Soviet military threat, and believe that no significant change in this distribution would have been warranted. I realize that broad dissemination of such intelligence material, even with proper security safeguards, involves increased risks of unauthorized disclosures, but also believe that this risk is balanced by the real need-to-know of those concerned with overall assessment of the Soviet military posture and with developing appropriate U. S. capabilities to meet the threat.

John A. McCone
Director

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

61-9576

11 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: Distribution of the Bethe Panel Report.

The President has noted the wide distribution of the Bethe Panel Report. He would like your views as to the propriety of this distribution, and any suggestions you may wish to make for improving procedures to limit unnecessarily wide distribution of sensitive documents.


MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

~~SECRET~~